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I. INTRODUCTION
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INCE their advent in the early 2000s [1] , [2] , physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have been used as a building block in numerous authentication protocols. The authentication is either unilateral, i.e., one-way, or mutual, i.e., two-way, and usually takes place between a low-cost, resource-constrained device hosting a PUF and a high-cost, resource-rich server storing a selection of the input-output pairs of this PUF. The selected pairs embody a shared secret between both parties, and a device is hence not required to store a secret key in non-volatile memory (NVM). This way, physically invasive attacks on NVM, such as optically scanning its cell contents or microprobing its bus [3] , are precluded. The output of a PUF, however, is noisy and hinders the design of a serviceable protocol. Moreover, to avoid the amplification of noise, Manuscript received June 28, 2018; revised November 16, 2018 and January 2, 2019; accepted January 2, 2019. Date of publication January 7, 2019; date of current version May 9, 2019 . This work was supported in part by the Research Council, KU Leuven, under Grant C16/15/058, and in part by the European Research Council (ERC) through Advanced Grant 695305 (CATHEDRAL). The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Prof. Yiorgos Makris.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS.2019.2891223 a PUF is highly constrained in its use of non-linear operations and is therefore prone to machine learning. Stated otherwise, the level of diffusion and confusion that can be achieved by a PUF is no match for a properly designed cipher.
Delvaux [4, Ch. 5] analyzed the security and practicality of 21 PUF-based authentication protocols, thereby revealing numerous problems to the extent that only six candidates survive. In parallel, Becker [5] , [6] and Tobisch and Becker [7] pushed the boundaries of machine-learning attacks on PUF-based protocols. The previous analyses, however, are not up-to-date with proposals beyond the year 2014. In this work, we illustrate that the research field of developing new PUF-based authentication protocols remains a minefield. Efficient attacks on the PolyPUF protocol of Konigsmark et al. [8] , the OB-PUF protocol of Gao et al. [9] , the RPUF protocol of Ye et al. [10] , the LHS-PUF protocol of Idriss and Bayoumi [11] , and the PUF-FSM protocol of Gao et al. [12] are presented. More precisely, our examination reveals that all five designs are unsuccessful attempts to impede machinelearning attacks through the use of lightweight obfuscation logic.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the notation and provides preliminaries. Section III specifies and obliterates the five protocols. Section IV provides guidelines for future protocol designers such that the same mistakes are less likely to reoccur. Section V concludes this work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
As exemplified in Table I , constants are denoted by characters from the Greek alphabet, whereas random variables and their outcomes are denoted by characters from the Latin alphabet. Scalars are denoted by normal lowercase characters. Vectors are denoted by bold-faced, lowercase characters. All vectors are row vectors. The all-zeros vector is denoted by 0. Matrices are denoted by bold-faced, uppercase characters. The λ × λ identity matrix is denoted by I λ . A diagonal matrix is defined by listing the entries on its main diagonal, e.g., I 2 = diag(1, 1). A set, often but not necessarily referring to all possible outcomes of a random variable, is denoted by an uppercase, calligraphic character, e.g., X . The set of all λ-bit vectors is denoted by {0, 1} λ . A multivariate normal random variable X with mean μ and covariance matrix is denoted by X ∼ N(μ, ). The expected value of a random variable X is denoted by E x←X [X] . For binary vectors, bitwise inversion and bitwise modulo-2 addition are denoted by ¬x and x 1 ⊕ x 2 respectively. Custom-defined functions are printed in a sansserif font, e.g., Hamming distance HD(x 1 , x 2 ).
B. Arbiter PUF
A PUF maps a binary input, i.e., the so-called challenge c ∈ {0, 1} λ , to a binary, device-specific output, i.e., the so-called response r ∈ {0, 1} η . There is a special interest for PUFs that support a large-sized challenge c, e.g., having λ = 128, because this facilitates the design of an authentication protocol considerably. Even those who are given unrestricted access to such a PUF can neither gather nor tabulate all of its challenge-response pairs (CRPs) within the lifetime of its hosting device. For the well-known Arbiter PUF [13] , which quantizes the difference v between the propagation delays of two reconfigurable paths as is shown in Fig. 1 , a large λ can be supported. The challenge c determines for each out of λ switching elements whether path segments are crossed or uncrossed.
If the delay difference v > 0, the single-bit response r = 1; otherwise, r = 0. To resist brute-force attacks, protocols usually require a long response r, e.g., having η = 128. This expansion can be achieved either by laying out η Arbiter PUFs in parallel, or by concatenating the response bits r of a single Arbiter PUF that evaluates η challenges c. Unfortunately, noise sources within the device, as well as changes to its external environment, imply that an initially generated response r slightly differs from its reproductionr. The averaged bit error rate E c←{0,1} λ [HD(R,R)]/η typically lies between 5% and 15%. A crucial insight is that the reproducibility of the response r to a given challenge c increases monotonically with the absolute value |v|. A continuous spectrum ranging from highly stable to highly noisy response bits hence arises.
C. Additive Delay Model and Implied Correlations
Unfortunately, all 2 λ CRPs (c, r ) of an Arbiter PUF are determined by the variability of a limited number of circuit elements. To enable a prompt exposition of the implied correlations, the sloped edges that characterize electrical signals in real-world circuits are approximated by instantaneous transitions. Consequentially, only two variables per stage affect the overall input-output behavior of an Arbiter PUF, as detailed in Fig. 2 . Starting from this set of 2 λ variables, Fig. 2 . The delay behavior of a single stage of an Arbiter PUF. If for a given challenge c, the delay difference between the upper and lower path accumulated to t in after the first i −1 stages, then stage i adds either t i,0 or t i,1 , depending on the value of challenge bit c i . Note that for c i = 1, the upper and lower paths are reversed, and the sign of t in is flipped accordingly.
the original design team [13, Sec. 5.2.1] already derived a more compact representation using only λ + 1 variables. More precisely, the eventual delay difference v can be described by a dot product: v = m s T in (1) , where the variability model m ∈ R λ+1 aggregates elementary delay differences, and where s ∈ {−1, 1} λ+1 is the result of an invertible challenge transformation.
v = m s
T , where m = t , 
Not only to simulate Arbiter PUFs in software [14] , but also to study correlations between CRPs, it is convenient to assume a distribution for the variability model M. Owing to the central limit theorem, the outcomes of a complex physical process tend to obey a normal distribution. For a population of ideally manufactured Arbiter PUFs, it can thus be assumed that T ∼ N(0, σ 2 t I 2λ ). Upon application of the linear transformation in Eq. (1), this multivariate normal distribution changes as given in Eq. (2) . To illustrate that infinitely large populations of Arbiter PUFs and random oracles [15] substantially differ in their statistical properties, consider the probability c 2 ) . For the population of Arbiter PUFs, where transformed challenges s capture correlations more adequately, it can be derived that ρ flip increases roughly proportionally with HD(s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ [0, λ] such that the interval [0, 1] is quasi completely covered [16, Fig. 12] . For the population of random oracles, the probability ρ flip = 1 /2 for any given challenge pair (c 1 , c 2 ) where c 1 = c 2 .
So far, Arbiter PUFs were modeled as a deterministic functions. To incorporate the effect of both internal noise sources and environmental changes, the latter of which are assumed to be centered around a constant nominal value, the quantization can be extended to (v + n) ≶ 0, where N ∼ N(0, σ 2 n ) with respect to the infinite set of evaluations [17] . Given that only the sign of the delay difference v matters in determining the nominal value of its corresponding response r , one may arbitrarily choose σ 2 t = 1 as long as σ 2 n is scaled accordingly.
D. Machine Learning
Another manifestation of the correlated structure of an Arbiter PUF is that machine-learning algorithms training on a relatively small set of CRPs, i.e., {(c 1 , r 1 ), (c 2 , r 2 ), · · · , (c ω , r ω )}, where ω 2 λ , can produce a modelm that allows to accurately predict the unseen response r ω+1 to any given challenge c ω+1 . The probability p acc ∈ [ 1 /2, 1] that a prediction for a given Arbiter PUF is correct is referred to as the accuracy, and usually increases monotonically with ω. If pairs (s, r ) instead of pairs (c, r ) are used as training data, the problem of learning m becomes quasi-linear, i.e., the quantization v ≶ 0 is the only remaining non-linearity, and hence straightforward to handle for numerous algorithms. Through artificial neural networks (ANNs) [18] , support vector machines (SVMs) [13] , and logistic regression [14] , it has been shown that for silicon implementations of an Arbiter PUF with λ = 64 stages, a set of ω = 10 3 CRPs (s, r ) suffices to obtain accuracies E m←M [P acc ] ≥ 90%.
Given that such experimental works all confirm the validity of the linear delay model in Eq. (1), it has become a common practice to demonstrate the feasibility of a machine-learning attack on randomly generated instances of the mathematical abstraction M [5] , [14] . This favors both the reproducibility and the comparability of results, and it also excludes the possibility that a flaw in the circuit or the layout of a given Arbiter PUF implementation facilitates attacks. Noise sources, however, pollute both training and testing data (s, r ), so if omitted from the mathematical abstraction, the reported learning efficiency is usually slightly higher than for experimental data.
E. Improving the Learning Resistance
In an attempt to resist machine-learning attacks, numerous variations of the Arbiter PUF have been proposed. Unfortunately, such variations also increase the bit error rate and the footprint of the PUF to the extent that serviceable, lightweight designs remain learnable. For example, one version of the so-called χ-XOR PUF [14] , [19] consists of χ > 1 identically laid-out Arbiter PUFs that evaluate a common challenge c; the eventually released response bit is determined as r = r 1 ⊕ r 2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ r χ . Tobisch and Becker [7] demonstrated that even for costly parameter values such as λ = 64 and χ = 9, machine-learning attacks succeed. For the noisebased machine-learning attack of Becker [5] , which involves a repeated evaluation of each challenge c such that bit error rate of its response bit r can be estimated, the XOR operation is bypassed and even instances with λ = 128 and χ = 32 remain learnable. Noise sources might hence help rather than hinder an attacker.
An alternative or complementary line of defense, which is the topic of this paper, is the design of authentication protocols that either keep the response bits r of a PUF internal to its hosting device [2] or obfuscate the link between the public challenges c and the released response bits r [20] . The latter strategy usually entails the use of a true random number generator (TRNG). Regardless of the chosen strategy, Becker [6] and Tobisch and Becker [7] demonstrated that the release of variables that are correlated to r might still enable a machine-learning attack. For example, if the protocol leaks the error rate p error of a hidden response bit r , an estimate of the absolute value |v| can still be obtained. Once again, noise sources are thus shown to facilitate attacks.
F. Attacker Model
The analyzed authentication protocols adopt a frequently used attacker model [4, Ch. 5] . The enrollment of a PUF-enabled device takes place in a secure environment, and afterwards, an interface for accessing the CRPs might have to be irreversibly disabled. In the field, the protocols should resist both impersonation and denial-of-service attacks. Given that the device comprises a smart card, a radio-frequency identication tag, or another mobile entity, it is assumed that an attacker may obtain physical access. The server, however, features both secure computations and secure storage. The communication channel between both parties is assumed to be insecure. This implies that an attacker may not only eavesdrop on a genuine protocol run, but also manipulate, inject, and block messages.
III. PROTOCOLS
To facilitate the understanding of the analyzed authentication protocols for a visually oriented reader, Fig. 3 shows the hardware of a PUF-enabled device. The implementation efficiency is evidently reflected but is of secondary importance in light of the newly revealed security issues. For each protocol, we devise a method for training an accurate predictive modelm of the underlying Arbiter PUFs. This modelm allows the attacker to successfully impersonate the device an unlimited number of times, or at least every time the server opts to initiate a protocol run. For the LHS-PUF [11] and PUF-FSM [12] protocols, which both aim to provide mutual authentication, the server can be impersonated as well. Although the protocols are specified and attacked in chronological order, there is no problem in reading Sections III-A to III-E in a different order.
A. PolyPUF 1) Specification:
The so-called PolyPUF protocol of Konigsmark et al. [8] , where "Poly" stands for "Polymorphic", is specified in Fig. 4 . Each device hosts λ Arbiter PUFs that evaluate a common challenge c ∈ {0, 1} λ . Suggested values for λ are 32 and 64. To enroll a given device, the server collects ω CRPs (c , r ) and trains a predictive modelm for each Arbiter PUF. A suggested value for ω is 5000. After the enrollment, direct access to the CRPs (c , r ) is irreversibly disabled.
To preclude machine-learning attacks, a device that is deployed in the field XORs the received challenge c ∈ {0, 1} λ Fig. 3 . The hardware of a PUF-enabled device for the analyzed authentication protocols. Intermediary registers and control logic are not drawn. The symbol × on the boundary of a device denotes a one-time interface that is irreversibly disabled after the enrollment. (a) PolyPUF of Konigsmark et al. [8] .
(b) OB-PUF of Gao et al. [9] . (c) RPUF of Ye et al. [10] . (d) LHS-PUF of Idriss and Bayoumi [11] . (e) PUF-FSM of Gao et al. [12] .
with λ/γ concatenated copies of a nonce n 1 ∈ {0, 1} γ in order to form the PUF input c . Likewise, the released response r ∈ {0, 1} λ is the result of XORing the PUF output r with λ/δ concatenated copies of a nonce n 2 ∈ {0, 1} δ . Suggested values for γ and δ are 2 and 3 respectively. The authors do not comment on the fact that λ ∈ {32, 64} is not an integer multiple of δ = 3; we therefore assume that one copy of n 2 is truncated to mod(λ, δ) ∈ {2, 1} bits. To save resources, the γ +δ random bits could be generated by XORing unstable responses bits r rather than through a dedicated TRNG. This solution, however, requires that a well-chosen challenge c is programmed into the device during the enrollment. To authenticate a device, the server checks whether the response r to a randomly chosen challenge c matches with at least one out of 2 γ +δ possible responsesr. To account for the noisiness of the PUFs, only an approximate match is required as reflected by the Hamming distance threshold ε.
The authors experiment with ANNs in order to validate the security of their protocol. Most notably, they attempt to exploit the statistical weaknesses of the underlying Arbiter PUFs in gathering a set of ω training CRPs (c i , r i ) where the nonces (n 1 , n 2 ) are supposed to remain unchanged. For this purpose, challenge c 1 is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} λ , and all other challenges c i , where i ∈ [2, ω ], are randomly chosen such that HD(c i , c i−1 ) = 1. Out of 2 γ +δ unique responses r i ∈ {0, 1} λ , the one value that minimizes HD(r i , r i−1 ) is retained. The authors are delighted that, even with τ = 10 8 device queries and 10-30 neurons in the hidden layer, the obtained modeling accuracies p acc do not significantly exceed the ideal value of 50%.
2) Attack: We point out that the authors' non-functional attack can be functionalized through a minimal modification. Given a proper understanding of the challenge transformation in (1), it is evident that an attacker should choose consecutive challenges (c i ,
If nonce n 1 remains unchanged, it holds for the former case that HD(s i , s i−1 ) = 1, and the value of HD(r i , r i−1 ) is hence expected to be small. If nonce n 2 remains unchanged as well, it follows that an equally small Hamming distance HD(r i , r i−1 ) is output by the device. Thus, an attacker can assume that if HD(r i , r i−1 ) ≤ ε 1 , where ε 1 is a well-chosen threshold, that nonces (n 1 , n 2 ) remained unaltered.
The main concern, however, is that a single wrongly selected response r i could suffice to corrupt the whole training set. The Monte Carlo experiment in Fig. 5 demonstrates that corruptions are not likely to occur. For each out of 10 5 sets of λ randomly generated PUFs
is randomly chosen such that HD(s i , s i−1 ) = 1, and nonces n 1,i−1 and n 2,i−1 are chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} γ and {0, 1} δ respectively. For each combination of nonce differences (n 1,i ⊕ n 1,i−1 ) ∈ {0, 1} γ and (n 2,i ⊕ n 2,i−1 ) ∈ {0, 1} δ , the estimated probability mass function of HD(R i , R i−1 ) is shown. It benefits an attacker that the first and the second curves from the left can easily be distinguished. As a side note, the 1-bit offsets among the curves with HD(n 2,i , n 2,i−1 ) ∈ {1, 2} exist because λ is not an integer multiple of δ.
Moreover, an attacker can play safe and only add a new CRP (c i , r i ) to the training set if the difference between the smallest and the second smallest value of HD(R i , r i−1 ) is greater than or equal to a well-chosen threshold ε 2 . This way, Algorithm 1 is able to produce a training set of w correctly linked CRPs (c i , r i ) from sending τ w queries to the PUF-enabled device. In order to maximize w for a given τ , each received response r is XORed with 2 δ possible patterns (n 2 n 2 · · · ). There are 2 γ +δ possible pairs of nonces (n 1 , n 2 ) that may underlie the w training CRPs (c i , r i ), and the attacker does not know which pair. It can, however, arbitrarily be assumed that n 1 = 0 and n 2 = 0, and the corresponding pairs (s i = s i , r i = r i ) are then used for training λ predictive modelsm, i.e., one for each Arbiter PUF. Given that the server iterates over 2 γ +δ possible pairs (n 1 , n 2 ) to authenticate a device, the previous set of λ modelsm always suffices for impersonation purposes.
Algorithm 1 PolyPUF Training Set
In spite of what Konigsmark et al. [8] suggest, there is no need for the ANN to have 10-30 neurons in the hidden layer. The bare minimum, i.e., a network consisting of a single neuron, suffices to capture the dot product v = m s T that underlies an Arbiter PUF. A minor inconvenience is that ANNs inherently serve a regression purpose rather than a classification purpose. To overcome this issue, we use resilient backpropagation to independently train two singleneuron networks that approximate response bits r and their inverses ¬r respectively. As shown in Fig. 6 , the real-valued outputs of the corresponding activation functions are compared to obtain a predictionr ∈ {0, 1}. Fewer than τ = 10 5 queries suffice to obtain accuracies E[P acc ] ≥ 90%, whereas Konigsmark et al. [8] were unable to exceed the ideal value of 50% using τ = 10 8 queries. Each dot corresponds to five runs of Algorithm 1 using different devices and hence displays the averaged accuracy of modeling 5λ = 320 Arbiter PUFs; parameters were configured as ε 1 = ε 2 = 14. For the noisy case, the standard deviation σ n = 0.325 √ λ so that the expected error rate between a nominal response r and its reproductionr is approximately 10%. The responses r to 1000 testing challenges c are all nominal values, which corresponds to the best-case scenario where the server stores infinitely precise predictive modelsm of the λ Arbiter PUFs that are hosted by a given device.
For the sake of completeness, it is worth mentioning that although Algorithm 1 succeeds as a deobfucation tool, its robustness and its efficiency might still be open for improvement. One idea is to track all 2 γ = 4 values of nonce n 1 instead of a single value only. This implies that, in each algorithm pass, an attacker stores four ordered responses r to the given challenge c. Ultimately, the four tracks will have to be combined into a single training set of CRPs. There are (2 γ − 1)! (2 δ ) 2 γ −1 = 3072 non-equivalent combinations of which exactly one results in server-acceptable predictive modelsm. A relatively small-sized search among machine-learning experiments hence suffices to find the one. A complementary idea is to store real-valued responses r ∈ [0, 1] that reflect the stability, given that multiple noisy readings for each nonce n 1 ∈ {0, 1} γ might be available anyway. The Hamming distance computation HD(r, a) can be generalized to λ j =1 |a j − r j |. We emphasize that our attack cannot simply be mitigated by increasing the nonce sizes γ and δ. It can be seen in Fig. 5 that the size of nonce n 1 ∈ {0, 1} γ has no effect on the two peaks that are required to be distinguishable for Algorithm 1. Nonce n 2 ∈ {0, 1} δ , however, could be enlarged in order to create a larger number of non-centralized, equidistant peaks, thereby decreasing the inter-peak distance that is relevant for the attack in its current form. Unfortunately, a large δ does not prevent an attacker from estimating the λ bit error rates corresponding to each input c . As demonstrated by Becker [6] , bit error suffice to machine-learn an Arbiter PUF, i.e., the values of the responses are not required to be known. Algorithm 1 can thus be simplified such that the deobfuscation of nonce n 2 is not an objective anymore.
B. OB-PUF 1) Specification:
The so-called OB-PUF protocol of Gao et al. [9] , where "OB" stands for "Obfuscated", is specified in Fig. 8 . Each device hosts η Arbiter PUFs that evaluate a common challenge c ∈ {0, 1} λ . A suggested value for η is 3; a suggested value for λ is 64. To enroll a given device, the server collects ω CRPs (c , r) and trains a predictive modelm for each Arbiter PUF. A value for ω has not been suggested. After the enrollment, direct access to the challenge c is irreversibly disabled.
To prevent an attacker from training an accurate predictive model of its PUFs, a device that is deployed in the field extends the received challenge c ∈ {0, 1} λ−δ according to the value of a nonce n ∈ {0, 1} γ . For the suggested values λ = 64, γ = 1, and δ = 5, each PUF evaluates a challenge c ∈ {(0 1 0 1 0 c 1 c 2 · · · c 59 ), (c 1 c 2 · · · c 59 1 0 1 0 1)}. To authenticate a device, the server checks whether the responser to a randomly chosen challenge c is equal to at least one out of 2 γ predicted responsesr.
For the suggested response length η = 3, a randomly guessing attacker can impersonate any given device with a success probability that lies in the interval [2 −η , 2 γ −η ] = [1/8, 1/4]. Unfortunately, the authors did not specify a functional method to scale their protocol to a comfortable security level, e.g., 64 bit or more. Using their suggestion to execute the protocol multiple times in series, such security levels would only be achievable for noiseless PUFs, i.e., an ideal abstraction. For example, under the conservative assumption that the above success probability is a constant 1/4, a 64-bit security level can be achieved through a sequence of 64/2 = 32 protocol runs, i.e., 32 CRPs (c,r) are transferred for each authentication.
To obtain a comfortable security level in the presence of noise, thereby enabling a meaningful further analysis, we assume that a fraction of the consecutive protocol runs is allowed to fail. Given that the attacker is granted an identical fraction of wrong guesses, more than 32 protocol runs would be required in order to maintain the aforementioned 64-bit security level. We emphasize that our assumption leaves the original protocol in Fig. 8 intact, and does neither increase nor decrease the learning efficiency that a machine-learning and device-querying attacker can obtain.
To validate the security of their protocol, the authors experiment with logistic regression. For any given device, they collect the responsesr to ω randomly chosen challenges c. They consider it a success that even with ω = 10 6 training CRPs (c,r), the obtained accuracy p acc does not exceed 72%.
2) Attack: The authors assume that the mediocre accuracy of 72% supports their security claims, but for a conservative cryptologist any value other than 50% is symptomatic of an underlying weakness. Indeed, we now devise a learning strategy that is several orders of magnitude more efficient. Consider an attacker who obtains physical access to a PUF-enabled device and records its responser to a randomly chosen challenge c ∈ {0, 1} λ−δ not once but β 1 2 γ times. If a response bitr k , where k ∈ [1, η] , remains constant for all β 1 evaluations, it is likely that the corresponding Arbiter PUF has the same nominal value for the response r to all 2 γ underlying challenges c , and 2 γ transformed CRPs (s , r ) can hence be appended to a training set for that particular Arbiter PUF. Algorithm 2 applies this mechanism to a list of ω 1 randomly chosen challenges c and all η Arbiter PUFs of a given device. Constant ε 1 , where ε 1 β 1 , represents the maximum number of opposing evaluations such that the nominal value of response r is still deemed constant. Fig. 9 shows the obtained modeling accuracies as a function of the number of device queries τ 1 = ω 1 β 1 . For each dot, we generate 20 PUFs M ∼ N 0, diag( 1 /2, 1, 1, · · · , 1, 1 /2) and average the obtained accuracies. The machine-learning algorithm can be chosen arbitrarily; we opted for linear regression, as specified later-on in (4) . For the noiseless case, where β 1 = 8 and ε 1 = 0, it can be seen that the authors' highest reported accuracy of 72% can already be exceeded after τ 1 = 10 3 queries. From τ 1 = 10 4 queries onwards, the accuracy reaches an upper bound of approximately 85%. 
Algorithm 2 OB-PUF
To incorporate noise, we choose the standard deviation σ n = 0.325 √ λ so that the expected error rate between a nominal response r and its reproductionr is approximately 10%. For β 1 = 8 and ε 1 = 1, it can be seen that learning efficiency is only slightly lower than for the noiseless case.
Increasing the value of β 1 does not help in obtaining accuracies that exceed 85%. Although we confirmed this statement experimentally, a more insightful explanation for the case of a noiseless Arbiter PUF is that the probability that a training CRP (s, r ) is corrupted is 2 −β 1 −1 ≈ 0.2% and hence negligible already. Instead, the constraint that the value of a response bit r remains constant for all β 1 evaluations is presumed to be responsible for the upper bound on the accuracy. Although Algorithm 2 selects challenges c uniformly at random from {0, 1} λ−δ , the subset of retained challenges c is not necessarily uniform anymore and might hence not capture the integral behavior of an Arbiter PUF. Optionally, one could use the obtained predictive modelsm as a deobfuscation tool and gather the responses r to a more uniform set of challenges c. Algorithm 3 selects challenges c for which all 2 γ predicted responsesr are far apart from each other and hence distinguishable. Fig. 10 shows the obtained modeling accuracies as a function of the number of device queries τ 2 = ω 2 β 2 . For each dot, 
Algorithm 3 OB-PUF Training Set II
we generate again 20 random PUFs, and average the obtained accuracies. The 85% accurate predictive models for τ 1 = 10 4 were used. We used constants ε 2 = η = 3 and ε 3 = 2 It can be seen that accuracies exceeding 90% can now be obtained.
C. RPUF 1) Specification:
The so-called RPUF protocol of Ye et al. [10] , where "R" stands for "Randomized", is specified in Fig. 11 . To prevent the machine learning of its Arbiter PUF, a device either does or does not invert the bits of any received challenge c ∈ {0, 1} λ depending on the value of a nonce n ∈ {0, 1} γ . Suggested values for λ are 
To enroll a device, the server requests the response r to each out of ω randomly generated challenges c not once but β 2 γ times and collects the 2 γ unique values. A suggested value for β is 100. Evidently, slightly differing responses r are attributed to the noisiness of the PUF and are not considered unique. To authenticate a device up to ω times, the server checks whether the responser to a challenge c is sufficiently close to one out of its 2 γ prerecorded values. The authors emphasize that the nonce N should be uniformly distributed over {0, 1} γ . Otherwise, frequency analysis would allow an active, device-querying attacker to partition the unique responses r to each out of α challenges c into 2 γ sets that each correspond to a given value of nonce n ∈ {0, 1} γ . In their security analysis, the authors collect data from numerous protocol runs and conduct machine-learning experiments that do not exceed an accuracy of ≈ 75%. They, consequentially, consider their protocol fit for deployment in practical use cases.
2) First Attack: Analogous to the growth of cracks in solid materials, the mediocre accuracy of ≈ 75% should have been a warning of an imminent failure. Indeed, we now devise an alternative learning strategy that is orders of magnitude more efficient. Given physical access to the PUF-enabled device, an attacker can obtain the 2 γ unique responses r ∈ {0, 1} λ to each out of α arbitrarily chosen challenges c ∈ {0, 1} λ . There are hence (2 γ !) α possibilities for constructing a combined training and testing set that contains 2 γ α λ transformed CRPs (s , r ). When exhaustively applying a machine-learning algorithm to each out of these sets, the one and only correct mapping can be observed to result in the highest accuracy.
Although the protocol allows for an active, device-querying attacker, it is worth mentioning that a passive, eavesdropping attacker can obtain an accurate predictive model in a similar manner despite facing a larger exhaustive search for the same number of deobfuscated CRPs (s , r ). After eavesdropping on α genuine protocol runs, the latter search space consists of 2 γ α combined training and testing sets that contain α λ transformed CRPs (s , r ) each. Fig. 12(a) shows that for both active and passive attackers, a relatively limited computational effort corresponds to a relatively large number of CRPs.
We apply linear regression [21, 12th printing, Sec. 4.2] to each set of transformed CRPs (s , r ). Although the learning capabilities of this deterministic approach are slightly inferior to several randomized training algorithms, its speed is unparalleled and hence favors exhaustive enumeration. As shown in (4), determining the least-squares solution of a system of linear equations is all what is needed. Although  Fig. 12(b) demonstrates that a fairly limited brute-force effort already allows for an accuracy of 90%, we suggest adopting a more efficient two-step approach to further improve the accuracy. First, numerous repeated executions of a small-sized exhaustive search, e.g., using α = 1 every time, can be used to deobfuscate the mapping between numerous transformed challenges s and their corresponding response bits r . Second, a potentially slower training algorithm with superior learning capabilities can be applied to a single large set of deobfuscated pairs (s , r ). This way, accuracies exceeding 99% can be achieved [14] .
We emphasize that the previously elaborated attack cannot simply be mitigated by increasing the value of security parameter γ , given that both the server and the attacker face a workload that scales exponentially with γ . Recall that for the server to enroll a device, the response r to every challenge c needs to be evaluated β 2 γ times. Likewise, the server needs to perform up to 2 γ Hamming distance measurements for each authentication. For the attacker, the ratio of the size of the exhaustive search to the size of the combined training and testing set follows a similar trend. A secure protocol would require an asymmetric workload instead, e.g., scaling polynomially with γ for the server and scaling exponentially with γ for the attacker.
3) Second Attack: For several PUF-based authentication protocols that were surveyed by Delvaux [4, Ch. 5] , the use of an LFSR turned out to be exploitable. Similarly for the RPUF protocol: depending on the non-specified internals of its LFSR, a straightforward deobfuscation method might be applicable. Our attack supports both Fibonacci and Galois configurations; the same holds for all possible feedback polynomials. We only make the intuitive assumption that the state has the same length as the randomized challenge c ∈ {0, 1} λ by which it is seeded.
As illustrated in Fig. 13 , starting from a seed-determined angle, the LFSR traverses an arc of a circular sequence of states, thereby generating a stream of λ 2 challenge bits c . Given that system specifications are public, an active attacker is able to choose two challenges c such that the two corresponding streams of λ CRPs (c ,r ) partially overlap, e.g., by 50%, as long as the value of nonce n ∈ {0, 1} γ remains unchanged. For γ ∈ {1, 2}, few queries are expected to be needed until responses (r 1 , · · · ,r λ ) and (r λ/2+1 , · · · ,r 3λ/2 ) eventually overlap. Subsequently, a third challenge c is repeatedly applied until the released response (r λ+1 , · · · ,r 2λ ) overlaps with its predecessor, and so forth. As the randomizing effect of nonce n is bypassed through this sliding-window technique, an unprotected Arbiter PUF remains.
4) New Protocol Version:
Independently of the above thirdparty security analysis 1 , the authors of the RPUF protocol [10] continued their investigative efforts and were able to mount a successful machine-learning attack based on simulated annealing and evolution strategy (ES) [22] . In an attempt to maintain the original security claim, they specified a lesser efficient version of the protocol. Most notably, a large χ-XOR PUF is deployed, whereas a single Arbiter PUF was deemed suitable for practical use cases in the original protocol version. For nonce length γ = 1 and challenge length λ = 64, the machinelearning attack succeeds up to χ = 6. For γ = 2 and λ = 64, the attack succeeds up to χ = 4. A second change to the protocol specification is that bitwise inversions are spread out over the complete challenge c rather than clustered. For nonce length γ = 1, there is no difference, but for γ = 2, Eq. (5) replaces Eq. (3). The LFSR remains underspecified in the updated version of the RPUF protocol [22] , and slidingwindow exploits are still unanticipated.
Our exhaustive search among machine-learning experiments was not developed with the intention of handling large XOR PUFs, but remains of theoretical interest. Suppose that the linear regression in Eq. (4) is replaced by a learning method that is suitable for XOR PUFs [5] , [7] . If for any such learning method, the total number of predictive models needed for a successful deobfuscation does not exceed, roughly speaking, 2 λ−γ , then the security level of the protocol against bruteforce attacks is lower than intended by its designers. To gain an advantage for the given parameter values γ = 2 and λ = 64, an active, device-querying attacker is constrained to the use of α = 13 unique challenges c ∈ {0, 1} λ and, therefore, a combined training and testing set of 3328 CRPs (c , r ). Given that accuracies of ≈ 55% suffice for a two-step approach, small XOR PUFs remain problematic [18, Fig. 4.4 ].
D. LHS-PUF 1) Specification:
The so-called LHS-PUF protocol of Idriss and Bayoumi [11] , where "LHS" stands for "Lightweight Highly Secure", is specified in Fig. 14 . The authors do not instantiate their protocol with a specific PUF design, but consistently refer to work on Arbiter PUFs and their variations. To enable a quantitative analysis later-on, we assume the use of a basic Arbiter PUF. This assumption is fair, considering that the LHS claim is presented as a universal truth. To enroll a given device, the server collects ω CRPs (c, r ) of the underlying Arbiter PUF and trains a predictive modelm. 1 A description of our two attacks on the original RPUF protocol [10] , i.e., the exhaustive search among machine-learning experiments and the LFSR exploit, was uploaded to the Cryptology ePrint Archive (https://eprint.iacr.org/) on November 23, 2017 and appeared online as part of Report 2017/1134 a few days later. The key dates for the VTS 2018 article [22] , which updates the specification of the RPUF protocol, were as follows: the initial paper submission was due on October 28, 2017, the cameraready version was due on February 9, 2018, and the paper was added to IEEE Xplore on May 31, 2018. After the enrollment, direct access to the response bits r is irreversibly disabled.
To preclude machine-learning attacks, response bits r are not directly exposed. Instead, a protocol run releases challenge tuples (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 , c 5 ) for which it is known that r 1 = r 2 ⊕ r 3 and r 2 = r 4 ⊕ r 5 . Long responses r ∈ {0, 1} η are obtained by concatenating the 1-bit responses r to η randomly generated challenges c ∈ {0, 1} λ . Suggested values for η are 64 and 128. To preclude trivial impersonation attacks using strongly correlated CRPs, it is imposed for several challenge pairs that HD(c, c ) > ε 1 .
2) Attack: A first flaw related to the minimum Hamming distance checks on various challenge pairs (c, c ) is that these do not detect the use of strongly correlated CRPs in general. For Arbiter PUFs and their variations, two-sided constraints on transformed challenge pairs (s, s ) would be more appropriate, i.e., ε 1 < HD(s, s ) < λ − ε 1 . A second flaw is that not sufficient challenge pairs are considered. Due to the dual role of response r 2 , an attacker can successfully impersonate a device by transmitting arbitrarily chosen challenges c 1,k and replying (c 4,k , c 5,k ) = (c 1,k , c 3,k ) or (c 4,k , c 5,k ) = (c 3,k , c 1,k ) for all response bit indices k ∈ [1, η] . Alternatively, an attacker can transmit challenges c 1,1 = c 1,2 = · · · = c 1,η , which implies (r 1 ,r 2 ,r 3 ) ∈ {(0, 0, 0), (0, ¬0, ¬0), (¬0, 0, ¬0), (¬0, ¬0, 0)}, and thus has a 50/50 chance of successfully impersonating a device by sending replies c 4,1 = c 4,2 = · · · = c 4,η and c 5,1 = c 5,2 = · · · = c 5,η later-on. By replaying the messages of the first successful impersonation attempt, the success rate can later be increased to 100%.
The previously described problems are easy-to-fix, but this is not the case for the misassumption that machine-learning attacks are precluded by releasing challenges c only. The modeling resistance is, in fact, equivalent to the serialized version [23] of a 3-XOR PUF, i.e., the attacker is given three challenges for which the response r = r 1 ⊕ r 2 ⊕ r 3 = 0. However, given that training data for r = 1 is missing, predictive models might converge to the equivalent of a biased Arbiter PUF that produces 0s exclusively. Therefore, we invert half of the training challenges, i.e., s = (−s 1 , −s 2 , . . . , −s λ , 1), and flip r accordingly.
We adopt a covariance matrix adaptation (CMA) variant of an ES [24] and perform minimal changes to its open-source implementation in MATLAB. Similar to Darwin's theory on biological evolution, the fittest candidates in a population of prospective modelsm recombine and mutate into a new and presumably fitter population. Although default values suffice for all parameters, it is crucial to define an appropriate fitness function, i.e., fitness : {0, 1} λ+1 → R. Results for the fitness function in (6) are shown in Fig. 15 . Because an accurate modelm is not always obtained, we only retain the best out of 10 runs.
We emphasize that the exposed 3-XOR equivalence is generic, thereby providing a shortcut for training predictive models of PUF designs other than, as per our assumption, Arbiter PUFs. Although less practical PUF designs could harden the learning problem solved in Fig. 15 , the LHS-PUF protocol does not surpass earlier protocol proposals where [12] . security arguments are intentionally rather than accidentally derived from χ-XOR PUFs [5] , [20] , [23] , [25] .
E. PUF-FSM 1) Specification:
The so-called PUF-FSM protocol of Gao et al. [12] , where "FSM" stands for "finite-state machine", is specified in Fig. 16 . Each device hosts an Arbiter PUF with λ challenge bits c. A suggested value for λ is 64. To enroll a given device, the server collects ω CRPs (c, r ) so that an accurate predictive modelm can be trained. A suggested value for ω is 10 4 . Both response bits r , which are the result of a comparison v ≶ 0, and their respective error rates p error , which decrease monotonically with |v|, can be predicted. After the enrollment, the interface for reading out response bits r is irreversibly disabled. During any out of a virtually unlimited number of protocol runs, the server is restricted to using the CRPs (c, r ) that have the lowest error rates p error . Considering the noisiness of their implemented Arbiter PUFs, the authors opt to maintain 1.8 · 10 17 out of 2 64 CRPs, which corresponds to a retention rate ρ ret ≈ 1%. For a hardwired FSM, having one start state and one end state as shown in Fig. 17 , the server randomly selects one out of a large number of paths from start to finish. The corresponding sequence of state transitions defines a sequence of η response bits r , where a variable number of z ≤ η bits suffices to reach the end state. A value for constant η has not been suggested. The proposed FSM consists of θ stages, where constant θ is odd. A suggested value for θ is 41. Odd-and even-numbered stages, in turn, consist of 1 and φ > 1 states respectively. A suggested value for φ is 3. Each state transition is defined by a δ-bit substrings of response x ∈ {0, 1} η . A total of z ∈ [(θ − 1)δ, η] response bits hence suffices for reach the end state. A suggested value for δ is 4. A flag f indicating whether or not the finish is reached is 1 and 0 for stage θ and stages 1 to θ − 1 respectively.
For a given path-defining response (r 1 r 2 · · · r η ), the server randomly selects a corresponding sequence of η challenges c that is subsequently transmitted to the device. The latter party then reconstructs the path from newly generated response bitsr i . If the end state is successfully reached, i.e., flag f = 1, the first z response bits are used to establish a shared secret with the server. This secret, in addition to nonce n 2 or n 3 , is then fed into a cryptographic hash function to perform the authentication. To preserve the secrecy of flag f , an attacker is not allowed to observe whether or not the authentication succeeds. Otherwise, an attacker would be able to replace a server-determined challenge c i by an arbitrary challenge c j , where c j = c i , and determine whether or not r i = r j . Observe that a repeated execution of this swapping mechanism would allow the attacker to gather a large training set of CRPs and hence model the Arbiter PUF such that only the sign ofm remains unknown.
2) Attack: It suffices for an attacker to eavesdrop on a single genuine protocol run in order to train an accurate predictive modelm of the underlying Arbiter PUF. Although the authors are aware that not only the response bits r but also their corresponding error rates p error should remain internal to the device, given a pre-existing attack by Becker [5] , it is overlooked that other variables that are correlated to the delay difference v are released. Most notably, for each serverdetermined challenge c, it is known that the absolute value |v| is relatively high. Given ω = 1 challenge c ∈ {0, 1} λ , having transformed version s ∈ {−1, 1} λ+1 , the two best guesses for a predictive model are hencem
The choice between these two modelsm corresponds to an entropy of one bit, which is negligible in a system-level security analysis. Fig. 18 shows that for a retention ratio ρ ret = 1%, the best out of two models already exceeds an accuracy of 85%, which suffices to consider the protocol broken. For each dot, we generate 100 PUFs M ∼ N 0, diag( 1 /2, 1, 1, · · · , 1, 1 /2) and average the best accuracies P acc for each out of two reproduced modelsm. Stated otherwise, we show an estimate of E[max(P acc , 1 − P acc )], where P acc is the accuracy for one out of two possible modelsm. For each individual modeling experiment, we select ω ∈ [1, 100] training and 1000 test challenges c uniformly at random from the subset C stab ⊆ C that contains the challenges with the most stable responses r , where |C stab |/|C| = ρ ret . We emphasize that for impersonation purposes, an attacker is only required to predict stable response bits r .
During a single protocol run, however, the server releases not one but η 1 challenges c i . There is hence plenty of margin to improve the accuracy of modelm. Becker et al. [26] previously addressed a similar learning problem using CMA-ES, but we require a fitness function of which the design is based on different principles, e.g., (7) .
The ω transformed challenges s i in the numerator originate from a genuine protocol run and are hence known to have stable response bits r i . The α transformed challenges s ref,i in the denominator are chosen uniformly at random from the set of all 2 λ transformed challenges and hence have response bits r that cover the full spectrum of error rates p error . To ensure that the fitness function allows for a fast evaluation, we use the same α transformed challenges s ref,i for each evaluation and limit ourselves to α = 1000. The scale invariance, i.e., ∀a ∈ R 0 , fitness(am) = fitness(m), is desired for positive factors a ∈ R + 0 , but the inclusion of negative factors a ∈ R − 0 once again implies that one bit of entropy always remains present. Because the randomized training algorithm does not always converge to an accurate modelm, we only retain the best out of five trials. For a retention ratio ρ ret = 1% and ω = 10 server-defined challenges c i , Fig. 19 shows that the best out of 2·5 = 10 models approaches the ideal accuracy of 100%.
The previously presented modeling techniques are successful despite disregarding the internal specifics of the FSM. For the sake of completeness, we briefly discuss how this disregarded knowledge could facilitate CMA-ES. For a given modelm and a given protocol run, the prospective η-bit response r could be computed. For this sequence of state transitions, the fitness of the best possible match with an available path can then be computed. Numerous path-matching metrics could be devised but, given that our main objective has already been achieved, we abstain from further exploration.
IV. AFTERMATH
In the aftermath of five broken protocols, it is crucial to report the lessons learned such that the same mistakes are prevented from being repeated in the future. Below, we provide our recommendations through the elaboration of five universal themes, thereby complementing the ten guidelines for designing a PUF-based authentication protocol as outlined by Delvaux [4, Ch. 5] .
A. Protocol Specifications
The claims of a protocol designer can only be verified by third parties upon providing a complete, unambiguous specification of the protocol. The most notable omission is that for the LHS-PUF protocol [11] , the claims "Lightweight" and "Highly Secure" even make up the name of the protocol, but its authors do not commit to an underlying PUF circuit. A design choice that impacts both the resource consumptions and the machine-learning resistance of the protocol is thus unmade. Furthermore, the authors of the OB-PUF protocol [9] did not specify a mechanism for expanding and dealing with the noise of its 3-bit responses r. Lastly, the LFSR used in the RPUF protocol [10] , [22] is underspecified, even though its most intuitive instantiation would allow for overlapping challenge streams and, consequentially, an impersonation attack.
Nevertheless, the authors of all five protocols deserve credit for their compliance with Kerckhoffs' principle [27] , i.e., the specification of the obfuscation logic is public. On the contrary, Mispan et al. [28] , [29] recently proposed three PUF-based authentication protocols of which the specification is private, i.e., they rely on the almost universally rejected paradigm of security through obscurity. To be clear: obscurity is the only protective measure, which differs from cases where obscurity augments an inherently secure system. If the complete specification of either protocol would be made public, the modeling resistance degrades to a conventional Arbiter PUF. It hence only takes one disgruntled employee of the system provider, or one attacker who recovers the netlist through the side-channel analysis or physical delayering of a device [30] , to instantly compromise all devices in the field.
B. The Interpretation of Semifunctional Attacks
For an impersonation attack to be practical and instantly applicable, accuracies of roughly 90% usually suffice. The exact number is, evidently, determined by the maximal noise level that a given protocol is designed to tolerate for given values of parameters ε, η, etc. Nevertheless, for the OB-PUF [9] and RPUF [10] protocols, where machine-learning experiments performed during the design phase resulted in accuracies of circa 70%, it was a mistake to be optimistic. Apart from the general tendency in cryptology that semifunctional attacks develop into fully functional attacks, an aggravating factor is that the fine-tuning of machine-learning attacks relies on trial and error. The infinite set of all parameterized supervised learning models and their parameterized training algorithms can only be traversed based on heuristics and personal experience. Any predictive model obtained is thus naturally open for improvement. Moreover, a first, semiaccurate model can be used as a deobfuscation tool, thereby facilitating the training of a second, more accurate model. For future protocol designs, we recommend treating any aberration from 50% as a precursor of a total break.
C. The Importance of Literature Study
Protocol designers should master the black-box behavior of all building blocks they use. Moreover, until an encyclopedic knowledge of existing attack methodologies is gained, protocol designers are unlikely to advance the state-of-the-art on secure system design. Below, we illustrate that for the five protocols of interest, a lack of literature study is the root cause of most problems.
• For Arbiter PUFs, we observe that the delay model in (1) and the intricacies of its implied correlations between CRPs are frequently misunderstood. The most notable fallacy in this regard is that Hamming distances between challenges c are used a measure of correlation, whereas transformed challenges s should be used instead. For the PolyPUF protocol [8] , this meant the difference between a functional and a non-functional attack. The OB-PUF proposal [9, Sec. III-C] builds upon the same misconception, although we have not mentioned this earlier-on given that our attack uses another pathway. Lastly, even though the authors of the LHS-PUF protocol [11] do not commit to a PUF circuit, they overlook that a one-sided Hamming distance check between challenges c would fail to preclude impersonation attacks for the most commonly used PUF circuits.
• Another frequent misconception is that keeping the response bits of an Arbiter-like PUF internal to a device automatically precludes machine-learning attacks.
Becker [6] , Becker et al. [26] already demonstrated this intuition to be deceiving, which implies that the designers of the LHS-PUF [11] and PUF-FSM [12] protocols fell into a publicly documented pitfall.
• For the PolyPUF [8] , OB-PUF [9] , and RPUF [10] protocols, the link between applied challenges and released responses is obfuscated instead. However, given that the obfuscation mechanism is not proven to be stronger than for two pioneering proposals, i.e., Slender PUFs by Rostami et al. [20] and Noise Bifurcation PUFs by Yu et al. [25] , both of which were broken by Becker [6] , Becker and Tobisch [7] even when instantiated with a (costly) 4-XOR PUF, it is unclear why one or more non-XORed Arbiter PUFs would suddenly suffice.
• For the RPUF protocol [10] , [22] , the exploitation of its LFSR is not unexpected, given that Delvaux [4, Ch. 5] previously reported similar problems for other PUF-based authentication protocols. The most notable resemblance is to the protocol of Van Herrewege et al. [31] , where an attacker also takes advantage of the LFSR by generating overlapping challenge streams. To preclude such attacks, Yu et al. [23] diffuse the entry points of the LFSR by making the state larger than the seed. An evident drawback of this countermeasure is that a larger LFSR requires more area and power.
D. Estimating and Comparing Resources
A fairly conservative approach to craft a PUF-based authentication protocol is to convert a noisy response r ∈ {0, 1} η into a stable secret key k ∈ {0, 1} κ , where η κ, and then use a keyed cryptographic algorithm to perform the authentication [4, Sec. 5.2] . A fuzzy extractor [32] can perform this conversion. Its realizations are usually based on an error-correcting code and require public helper data, which is stored either by the PUF-enabled device or by the server. In the latter case, the helper data is transferred with each protocol run. Under the assumption that response R is uniformly distributed over {0, 1} η and that the expected bit error rate E[P error ] ≤ 15%, a few thousand response and helper bits usually suffice to derive a uniformly distributed key k ∈ {0, 1} 128 such that its reconstruction is expected to fail with probability E[P fail ] ≤ 10 −6 [33] , [34] .
Designers of PUF-based protocols frequently aim to save resources by avoiding the use of an error-correcting code and/or the cryptographic logic, but as we have demonstrated for five recent proposals, taking shortcuts might be fatal for the system security. The irony is that for three out of five proposals, the obtained reductions in hardware footprint are small, if existing at all, and might not even have justified taking the risk:
• The PUF-FSM protocol [12] requires each PUF-enabled device to implement a cryptographic algorithm, so it suffices to compare the implementation efficiencies of the FSM and an error-correcting code. Although monolithic, large-sized codes require expensive decoders, it is a common practice to construct a large-size code from the repeated execution of one or more small-sized and hence cheaper codes. This refers, for example, to the sliding window of a convolutional code [34] and to the concatenation of a Golay and a repetition code [33] . Moreover, so-called reverse fuzzy extractors [18] , [31] only require a PUF-enabled device to implement an encoder, which is considerably cheaper than the corresponding decoder. Protocol-specific and more generic weaknesses for the reversed modus are known to exist [6] [4, Ch. 5], but several versions still hold up. Finally, each run of the PUF-FSM protocol requires the transfer of more than 160 · 64 = 10240 challenge bits c, which is more expensive then storing or transferring the helper data of a fuzzy extractor.
• The Poly PUF protocol [8] requires each device to implement 64 Arbiter PUFs having 64 stages each. Given that the estimated area of a 64-stage Arbiter PUF [35, Fig. 7 .1] is equivalent to 387 two-input NAND gates, consisting of four transistors each, the whole array consumes 24768 gate equivalent (GE). More areaefficient implementations of an Arbiter PUF evidently exist, but the main observation here is that a full-fledged PUF-based key generator easily fits within 5000 GE for the given security level κ ≈ 64 [33] . When basing all subsequent cryptographic operations on a lightweight cipher such as KATAN64 [36] , which adds around 1000 GE to the system, it becomes clear that the conservative authentication approach might be cheaper. For the sole purpose of performing area comparisons, Konigsmark et al. [8] conveniently switch to an alternative protocol version where a single Arbiter PUF generates all 64 response bits. Recall that their machine-learning experiments are all conducted on a harder-to-attack array of PUFs.
• The LHS-PUF protocol [11] might be area-efficient, but even for a modest security level, e.g., η = λ = 64, each protocol run entails the wireless transmission of 20480 challenge bits c. Moreover, the device-side TRNG is tasked with producing 12288 of these bits and is thus required to have a high throughput. Note that the use of a pseudorandom generator [37] to deterministically expand a truly random seed is not a part of the proposal.
• On the bright side, the original version of the RPUF protocol [10] allows for an overall efficient implementation.
To resist machine-learning attacks, however, the modified protocol version [22] requires not one but five or more Arbiter PUFs laid-out in parallel, thereby incurring a loss of competitiveness with respect to PUFs-based key generation. For those who are looking for a small-sized alternative, which remains unbroken to date, we refer to the so-called lockdown protocols of Yu et al. [23] .
• We were unable to assess the footprint of the OB-PUF protocol [9] , given that its authors did not specify mechanisms for expanding the response and handling noise.
E. Hindering Physical Attacks
The authors of the five analyzed protocols focus on purely mathematical attacks, thereby deferring physical attacks as an implementation-level afterthought. As pointed out by Yu et al. [23] , however, several existing side-channel attacks on PUFs can be mitigated at the protocol level. Most notably, a device-side and challenge-randomizing TRNG can preclude those attacks that require the eventual PUF input to be repeatedly evaluated. For example, Becker's [5] , [6] highly efficient and noise-based machine-learning attacks on Arbiter (XOR) PUFs are only functional if the noise level of each response bit can be estimated through a repeated evaluation. Likewise, Tajik et al. [38] capture the photonic emissions of an Arbiter (XOR) PUF for the purpose of measuring its elementary propagation delays, but numerous evaluations of a given challenge are needed to increase the signal-to-noise ratio to a workable level.
Although the five protocols already include a device-side TRNG with the intention of providing device-generated freshness and/or precluding machine-learning attacks, the opportunity to simultaneously preclude side-channel attacks is missed. Most notably, the LHS-PUF [11] and PUF-FSM [12] protocols feature a deterministic challenge path and thus do not attempt to counter a photonic-emission analysis. For the PolyPUF [8] , OB-PUF [9] , and RPUF [10] protocols, the challenge path happens to be randomized, but given that only 1, 2, or 3 bits of randomness are inserted, we conjecture that side-channel attacks become slightly more cumbersome at best. For future protocols, it can only be hoped that countermeasures to physical attacks are an intentional and full-fledged element of the design.
V. CONCLUSION
Through the use of custom-tailored machine-learning techniques, we were able to train an accurate predictive model of the Arbiter PUFs that underlie the PolyPUF protocol of Konigsmark et al. [8] , the OB-PUF protocol of Gao et al. [9] , the RPUF protocol of Ye et al. [10] , the LHS-PUF protocol of Idriss and Bayoumi [11] , and the PUF-FSM protocol of Gao et al. [12] , and hence enable an impersonation attack. Given that most of the revealed flaws could have been avoided through a proper literature study, this manuscript is yet another reminder that learning from history is a prerequisite for advancing the state-of-the-art. We also advocate for an improved risk management: if machine-learning experiments performed during the design phase already result in a semifunctional attack, the protocol should be reworked instead of published. Likewise, if the protocol does not outperform the most efficient methods for authentication through PUF-based key generation, the obfuscation approach is not a risk worth taking.
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